Court Cites Prima Facie Evidence and Accused’s Role in Delaying Trial to Deny Bail; Emphasizes Duty to Uphold Public Order and Constitutional Values
In a significant judgment dated December 2, 2025, the Karnataka High Court (Division Bench of Justices K.S. Mudagal and Venkatesh Naik T) dismissed the criminal appeal filed by Mr. Afzal Basha, accused No. 5 in a high-profile case involving the arson and vandalism of the D.J.Halli police station in Bengaluru. The case, which involves 146 accused charged under multiple sections of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAP Act), Indian Penal Code (IPC), and state laws, relates to a violent incident sparked by alleged religious provocations on social media, culminating in a mob attack on the police station on August 11, 2020.
The appellant challenged the rejection of his bail application by the trial court, arguing false implication, prolonged pre-trial detention of five years, and humanitarian grounds citing his mother’s cancer condition. However, the High Court upheld the trial court’s decision on three pivotal grounds: the existence of prima facie material implicating the appellant, the accused’s own role in causing trial delays, and the statutory bar on bail under Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act when prima facie case exists.
The incident originated from a Facebook post belittling Hindu deities by accused No. 19, which provoked a reactionary post about Prophet Mohammed by Naveen, a relative of a local MLA. A complaint alleging blasphemy against Naveen led to a police FIR. Later that evening, a large mob assembled at the D.J.Halli police station demanding Naveen’s arrest. The appellant, accused No. 5, was found to have actively instigated and mobilized people via WhatsApp and phone calls, leading to violent vandalism, damage to police property including 67 government vehicles, assault on police personnel, and disruption of public order. The police were compelled to resort to firing after other measures failed to disperse the crowd.
The prosecution’s case against the appellant was supported by eyewitness statements from police head constables and other witnesses, mobile phone call records, and forensic evidence from the seized mobile phone revealing appellant’s active communication with co-accused during the mob attack. The court emphasized that non-mention of the appellant’s name in the FIR did not weaken the case since the FIR is not exhaustive and other investigative materials were substantial.
Regarding the appellant’s contention on trial delay, the court observed that the accused themselves were responsible for the prolonged proceedings through repeated and successive applications, frequent changes of counsel, and non-appearance leading to warrants. The court rejected the argument that delay justified bail, as the accused cannot profit from their own deliberate delays.
The court also addressed the parity plea raised by the appellant, noting that other accused who were granted bail were not charged under the stringent provisions of the UAP Act, thus parity was not applicable. The humanitarian plea based on the appellant’s mother’s health was dismissed upon noting that she lived with her husband and other children, negating sole dependency claims.
Invoking fundamental duties under Article 51A of the Constitution, the court underscored that rights such as liberty under Article 21 come with corresponding duties including upholding public harmony, safeguarding sovereignty, and abstaining from violence. The judgment reiterated Mahatma Gandhi’s principle that “The true source of rights is duty,” holding that the appellant’s actions contravened these duties and thus bail was rightly denied.
The High Court’s detailed analysis reinforces the judiciary’s stance on maintaining public order and national integrity, especially in cases involving violence and unlawful activities under the UAP Act. The appeal was accordingly dismissed, and the appellant remains in judicial custody pending trial.
Bottom Line:
Bail application under UAP Act - Rejection of bail justified on grounds of prima facie evidence of involvement in organized crime, delay in trial due to accused's actions, and lack of parity with co-accused not charged under UAP Act.
Statutory provision(s): Sections 15, 16, 18, 20, 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Sections 120B, 143, 145, 147, 149, 188, 332, 333, 353, 427, 436, 504, 506, 34 of the Indian Penal Code; Section 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984; Section 2 of the Karnataka Prevention of Destruction and Loss of Property Act, 1981; Article 21 and Article 51A of the Constitution of India.
Afzal Basha v. National Investigation Agency, (Karnataka)(DB) : Law Finder Doc Id # 2829300
