Kochi, Jun 9 A preliminary investigation into the sinking of container vessel MSC ELSA 3 off the Kerala coast last year has revealed a series of failures by the ship's management and shore-based support systems, with investigators concluding that poor maintenance, defective equipment, inadequate training and weak safety oversight contributed to the disaster.
The findings are contained in an interim report submitted to the Kerala High Court by the central government on behalf of the Directorate General of Shipping while opposing the crew's plea to return to their home countries.
The Court on Tuesday permitted three crew members of the vessel-- the electro-technical engineer, a seaman and a motorman -- to return to their home countries.
The Liberian-flagged MSC ELSA 3, built in 1997, sank on May 25, 2025, around 38 nautical miles off the Kerala coast between Vizhinjam and Kochi. The vessel was carrying 643 containers, including 13 loaded with hazardous materials, and its sinking triggered environmental concerns along the coasts of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
According to the report, the vessel first experienced difficulties on May 24, 2025 when the ballast system failure triggered the initial list.
During the passage, within 12 hours, the list increased to 27 degrees. Some containers on deck fell overboard/jettisoned. Subsequently, the starboard side list was reduced to 22 degrees and appeared stable for a few hours.
"Then the list started increasing progressively. This malfunction cascaded into a complete blackout as the internal power generation systems failed, effectively rendering the ship inoperable. Without power or the ability to correct the listing condition, the situation deteriorated over approximately 24 hours until the vessel ultimately sank," it said.
The report said the vessel's ballast water system and heeling correction system suffered critical failures that eventually led to an uncontrollable 26-degree list to starboard.
"The ship's heeling tank mechanism was out of commission and not operating in automatic mode," the report said. It added that the vessel routinely corrected its list manually after cargo operations, resulting in delays and protests from terminals, including Vizhinjam.
Investigators found that the ageing vessel lacked the redundancies and monitoring capabilities available on modern ships. They said maintenance of ballast handling equipment was inadequate and pointed to longstanding technical defects.
The report noted that classification society Bureau Veritas had issued a "condition of class" regarding a defective cargo hold bilge pumping system and bilge sensors.
The investigation found that several critical defects remained unresolved for months. Essential spare parts requested as "critical" were not supplied even eight months after requisitions were raised.
"These requests had been flagged as 'critical' but remained unfulfilled at the time of the sinking," the report said.
Several ballast system components identified as defective in earlier inspections were also not replaced. Instead, temporary repairs continued beyond their intended lifespan.
The report identified multiple failures in the vessel's Safety Management System (SMS), including inadequate maintenance protocols, delayed spare parts supply, defective machinery and insufficient crew training.
Crew members reportedly lacked practical training in emergency ballast operations and blackout situations. While they possessed theoretical knowledge, many were unfamiliar with manual override procedures that became crucial during the emergency.
Investigators also found evidence of compromised watertight integrity. Water entered through a leaking manhole cover on Double Bottom Tank No 5 and a crack in the weld seam of No 5 Port Wing Ballast Tank, both discharging into Cargo Hold No 4.
"No documentation of these defects existed onboard, indicating poor reporting culture," the report stated.
The report further said that latent structural weaknesses and progressive flooding eventually led to catastrophic structural and hull failure.
"These structural issues indicate that the vessel was not seaworthy at the time of departure from the Vizhinjam Port," it said.
Attention was also directed at MSC's shore-based technical management system operated from Limassol, Cyprus.
Investigators found that abnormal pressure readings in the ballast management system were present for 36 hours before the vessel developed a severe list. However, neither automated monitoring systems nor shore personnel flagged the warning signs.
When the vessel first reported stability problems, the shore-based technical team allegedly took more than three hours to assemble specialists and establish effective communication.
The report described this as a critical delay during a period when corrective action could still have prevented the disaster.
It also found that shore support personnel lacked sufficient understanding of the ship's ballast system and emergency procedures.
Communication between the vessel and shore support was described as intermittent and ineffective during the final 12 hours before the sinking.
The company was also criticised for failing to address long-pending defects involving the heeling system, unmanned machinery control systems, cargo hold bilge systems and auxiliary engine alarm systems.
"The shore technical team has failed to monitor the pending defects, timely supply of spares and necessary support," the report said.
