Supreme Court Quashes Declaration of Jamaat-E-Islami Hind as Unlawful Association, Emphasizes Judicial Scrutiny and Natural Justice Under UAPA

SC Rules Tribunal Must Conduct Objective Adjudication with Credible Evidence, Upholds Right to Fair Hearing Despite Public Interest Concerns

In a landmark judgment delivered on December 7, 1994, the Supreme Court of India set aside the declaration by the Central Government that the Jamaat-E-Islami Hind (JEIH) is an unlawful association under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA). The apex court underscored the crucial requirement that any declaration of an association as unlawful must follow an adjudicatory process with proper judicial scrutiny and minimum standards of natural justice, even when national security and public interest are at stake.

The case arose after the Central Government, citing activities of the JEIH allegedly questioning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, issued a notification under Section 3(1) of the UAPA declaring the association unlawful. This notification was referred to a one-member Tribunal constituted under Section 5 of the Act for adjudication under Section 4, which confirmed the declaration. The JEIH challenged the order before the Supreme Court, contending primarily that the Tribunal’s inquiry was flawed and the material relied upon was insufficient and legally inadmissible.

Senior counsel Shri Soli J. Sorabjee argued on behalf of JEIH that the only material produced by the government was a resume based on intelligence reports from undisclosed sources and affidavits by government officials who did not depose from personal knowledge. Meanwhile, the JEIH produced sworn affidavits and witnesses denying the allegations. The counsel contended that the inquiry was judicial in nature and must permit the association to rebut the allegations effectively, with the Tribunal objectively assessing the credibility of conflicting evidence.

The Solicitor General, representing the government, argued that the UAPA's process is akin to preventive detention laws, where the Tribunal’s role is more advisory and the government’s subjective satisfaction suffices. He asserted that disclosure of sources of intelligence is not necessary when public interest demands confidentiality.

The Supreme Court, led by Justice J.S. Verma, thoroughly analyzed the statutory scheme and the nature of inquiry required under the UAPA. The Court clarified that:

1. The Tribunal’s inquiry under Section 4 is judicial, requiring adjudication of whether there is “sufficient cause” to declare an association unlawful, not merely a review of subjective satisfaction.

2. The Tribunal must give the association a reasonable opportunity to show cause and conduct an inquiry akin to a civil proceeding, applying the rules of evidence as far as practicable.

3. While the government may withhold information deemed against public interest to disclose, the Tribunal must have access to such confidential material to assess its credibility and form its own independent opinion.

4. The Tribunal cannot simply accept the government’s version without testing its veracity, especially when the association presents sworn denial and evidence rebutting the government’s claims.

5. Minimum natural justice requires the Tribunal to devise procedures to evaluate confidential evidence without compromising public interest, including in-camera examination of witnesses or material if necessary.

The Court held that the Tribunal in this case failed to discharge its judicial function properly by not requiring the production or examination of the confidential sources or evidence to test their credibility. Instead, it merely accepted the government’s assertions without objective scrutiny, rendering the adjudication meaningless and arbitrary.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the Tribunal’s confirmation of the unlawful declaration against JEIH, and dismissed the writ petition challenging the constitutionality of the UAPA provisions. However, the Court left open the possibility for the government to initiate fresh action if it can produce credible material.

This judgment reinforces the principle that restrictions on fundamental rights, such as the right to freedom of association under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, must be reasonable and follow a fair, judicially supervised process. It distinguishes the UAPA’s adjudication from preventive detention procedures, emphasizing the necessity of objective determination and adherence to natural justice even in matters touching public security.

Statutory provisions

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 - Sections 2(f), 2(g), 3(1), 3(2), 3(3), 4(1), 4(2), 4(3), 5(1), 5(7), 6(1), 7, 8(1), 8(8), 9;

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Rules, 1968 - Rules 3(1), 3(2), 5, 14;

Constitution of India - Article 19(1)(c), Article 19(4)

Jamaat-E-Islami Hind v. Union of India, (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id # 160178