LawFinder.news
LawFinder.news

Supreme Court Rules Governor’s Suspension of Sentence Invalid During Pendency of Appeal

LAW FINDER NEWS NETWORK | September 5, 1960 at 10:59 AM
Supreme Court Rules Governor’s Suspension of Sentence Invalid During Pendency of Appeal

In Landmark Judgment on K.M. Nanavati Case, Supreme Court Holds Executive Power Under Article 161 Cannot Override Judicial Power Under Article 142 When Matter is Sub Judice


In a historic verdict delivered on September 5, 1960, the Supreme Court of India, in a Constitution Bench comprising Chief Justice B.P. Sinha and Justices J.L. Kapur, P.B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao, and K.N. Wanchoo, ruled that the Governor of a State does not have the power to suspend a sentence under Article 161 of the Constitution once the matter is sub judice before the Supreme Court under Article 142. The judgment arose from the controversial case of Commander K.M. Nanavati, convicted of murder by the Bombay High Court and sentenced to life imprisonment.


The case presented a constitutional conundrum concerning the interplay between the executive’s power to grant pardons and suspend sentences under Article 161 and the Supreme Court’s judicial power under Article 142 to pass orders necessary for complete justice in matters pending before it. The Governor of Bombay had suspended Nanavati’s sentence pending his appeal to the Supreme Court, ordering his detention in naval custody, which led to a legal challenge about the validity of such executive intervention during judicial proceedings.


The Supreme Court, after an exhaustive examination of the historical evolution of the royal prerogative of mercy in India, England, and the United States, as well as the relevant statutory provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code (Sections 401 and 426), held that the power of the Governor to suspend a sentence is plenary but limited by the pendency of judicial proceedings before the Supreme Court. The Court reasoned that while the Governor’s power to grant pardons, reprieves, remissions, and commutations is wide and essentially an executive act, it cannot supersede the judicial power of the Supreme Court when the case is before it.


The judgment carefully balanced the separation of powers between the executive and judiciary. It acknowledged that the Governor’s power under Article 161 and the Supreme Court’s power under Article 142 operate in overlapping fields when it comes to suspension of sentences but stressed that the Supreme Court’s power is paramount during the pendency of an appeal. The Court emphasized the principle of harmonious construction, stating that executive power under Article 161 does not cover the period when the Supreme Court has seisin of the matter, thereby preventing conflict and upholding the rule of law.


Furthermore, the Court upheld the Supreme Court’s Rule 5 under Order 21 of the Supreme Court Rules, which mandates that a petitioner sentenced to imprisonment must surrender before the petition is heard, dismissing the contention that the Governor’s suspension order exempted Nanavati from this rule.


Justice J.L. Kapur dissented, arguing in favor of the unfettered power of the Governor under Article 161, emphasizing the plenary nature of the executive’s clemency power and its independence from judicial rules.


Ultimately, the majority dismissed Nanavati’s application for exemption from surrendering, ruling that the Governor’s order suspending the sentence during the pendency of the special leave petition before the Supreme Court was not valid. The Court clarified that while the Governor could grant a full pardon even when the matter is before the Court, suspension of sentence pending appeal is within the judicial domain.


This landmark ruling has since become a cornerstone in Indian constitutional law, delineating the limits of executive clemency vis-à-vis judicial authority and affirming the supremacy of the judiciary in matters pending before it. It underscores the principle that the executive’s mercy powers cannot be used to circumvent judicial processes once the highest court has taken cognizance of the matter.


Statutory provisions

Constitution of India Articles 142, 145, 161; Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 Sections 401, 426; Supreme Court Rules, 1950 Order 21 Rule 5


K. M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay, (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id # 111633

Share this article: