Supreme Court Rules Payment of Mehar Must Adequately Maintain Divorced Muslim Women to Release Husband from Maintenance Liability

In landmark judgment in Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali, the Supreme Court emphasizes social justice, holding that only a reasonable lump sum payment under personal law can absolve a husband’s duty under Section 125 CrPC.

The Supreme Court of India, in a significant judgment dated May 8, 1980, delivered by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, has clarified the scope of Sections 125 and 127(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, relating to maintenance claims by divorced Muslim women and the effect of payment of mehar (dower) on such claims.

The appellant, Fuzlunbi, was divorced by her husband, K. Khader Vali, who had paid her a sum of Rs. 500 as mehar and Rs. 750 towards maintenance for the iddat period. Subsequently, the Magistrate, relying on Section 127(3)(b), cancelled the maintenance allowance previously granted under Section 125 CrPC. This cancellation was upheld by the Sessions Court and the High Court. Aggrieved, Fuzlunbi appealed to the Supreme Court.

Justice Krishna Iyer, speaking for the bench, condemned the lower courts’ approach, which, in his view, misinterpreted binding Supreme Court precedent in Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain Fissalli Chothia (1979). The Supreme Court held that the mehar amount tendered was “too ludicrous” to serve as an adequate maintenance substitute. The Court emphasized that Section 127(3)(b) of the CrPC, which allows cancellation of maintenance orders upon payment of a lump sum under personal law, requires that such payment be “more or less sufficient” to support the divorced wife and prevent her destitution.

The Court underscored the social welfare purpose behind Sections 125 to 127 CrPC, designed to protect neglected wives and destitute divorcees from moral and material destitution. It ruled that a mere ritualistic or nominal payment of mehar cannot extinguish the statutory obligation of a husband to provide maintenance under Section 125. The payment must be a reasonable equivalent to the maintenance amount that would otherwise be paid periodically.

Rejecting the High Court’s attempt to distinguish Bai Tahira’s case on tenuous grounds, the Supreme Court reiterated that judicial precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution is binding and cannot be circumvented through artificial distinctions. The judgment further elaborated on the concept of mehar under Muslim law, clarifying that it is not a price for marriage nor a substitute for maintenance post-divorce, but a token of respect and an essential incident of marriage.

The Court concluded that the lump sum payment of Rs. 500 mehar, which would yield negligible monthly income, was insufficient to relieve the husband from the continuing obligation of maintenance. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, reinstating the maintenance order for the appellant.

This ruling sets a critical precedent ensuring that Muslim women divorced by talaq are not left destitute by nominal mehar payments and that the secular provisions of the CrPC protecting maintenance claims remain effective and meaningful. It reaffirms the principle that personal or customary law payments must be adequate and realistic, aligning with the constitutional values of gender justice, social welfare, and the protection of vulnerable women.

Statutory provisions

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Sections 125, 127(3)(b), 482; Article 141 of the Constitution of India

Fuzlunbi v. K. Khader Vali, (SC) : Law Finder Doc Id # 104590