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Supreme Court Sets Aside Its 1984 Direction Transferring Corruption Trial of Former Maharashtra CM Antulay from Special Court to High Court

LAW FINDER NEWS NETWORK | April 29, 1988 at 9:05 AM
Supreme Court Sets Aside Its 1984 Direction Transferring Corruption Trial of Former Maharashtra CM Antulay from Special Court to High Court

Seven-Judge Bench Rules Transfer Was Without Jurisdiction, Violated Constitutional Rights; Trial Must Proceed Under Special Judge Provisions of 1952 Act


In a landmark judgment delivered on April 29, 1988, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising seven judges, allowed the criminal appeal of former Maharashtra Chief Minister Abdul Rehman Antulay, setting aside the Court’s own earlier direction dated February 16, 1984. The 1984 order had withdrawn Antulay’s corruption trial from the Special Judge’s Court constituted under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 ("1952 Act") and transferred it to the Bombay High Court for expeditious disposal.


The Supreme Court’s seven-judge Bench found that the 1984 direction was issued without jurisdiction, was contrary to statutory provisions, and violated Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution guaranteeing equality before law and the right to life and liberty. The Court held that the trial of offences under Section 6(1) of the 1952 Act was exclusively triable by Special Judges appointed by the State Government under Section 6 of the Act. The High Court was not a competent court to try such offences, and the Supreme Court could not confer such jurisdiction on it by judicial direction.


The case arose from allegations against Antulay of corruption during his tenure as Chief Minister of Maharashtra (1980-1982), based on complaints filed by respondent Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak of the Bharatiya Janata Party. After a protracted procedural history involving questions of sanction for prosecution, jurisdiction, and trial venue, the Supreme Court in its 1984 judgment (R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay) held that Antulay did not require legislative sanction for prosecution and ordered the Special Cases pending before the Special Judge to be transferred to the Bombay High Court for trial before a sitting High Court Judge. The directions were given suo motu, without prior pleadings or submission from Antulay.


The appellant challenged this transfer as illegal and violative of his fundamental rights, contending that the 1952 Act mandated trial only before a Special Judge and provided rights of appeal and revision to the High Court which were lost by the transfer. The subsequent trial before the High Court lasted several years, with numerous witnesses examined, but Antulay persisted in challenging the jurisdiction of the High Court to try the case.


In its 1988 verdict, the Supreme Court analyzed the legislative scheme of the 1952 Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("CrPC"), and constitutional provisions. It held:

1. Section 7(1) of the 1952 Act creates an exclusive jurisdiction for Special Judges to try offences specified under Section 6(1), notwithstanding any provision of the CrPC or other law.


2. The powers of transfer under Sections 406 and 407 of the CrPC and under Article 139A of the Constitution do not empower the Supreme Court or the High Court to transfer cases triable exclusively by Special Judges to themselves or to any court other than a Special Judge.


3. The 1984 directions transferring the case to the Bombay High Court were given per incuriam (in ignorance of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by the 1952 Act) and were thus void and without jurisdiction.


4. The transfer resulted in denial of procedural safeguards guaranteed by law, including the right to be tried by a competent court and the right to appeal and revision, thus violating Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.


5. The principle of audi alteram partem (right to be heard) was violated as the directions were issued without giving the appellant an opportunity to be heard on the question of transfer.


6. The Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to correct its own errors when fundamental rights are violated, even if formal review procedures are not strictly followed.


7. The trial must proceed in accordance with the 1952 Act, before a Special Judge appointed under that statute, restoring the procedural rights of the appellant.


The majority judgment emphasized that no person, regardless of status or political position, is above the law, and that justice must be administered in accordance with the procedure established by law. It also acknowledged the unfortunate delay and suffering caused by procedural wrangles, underscoring the need for expeditious and fair trial consistent with constitutional guarantees.


The minority view, expressed by two judges, while agreeing that the 1984 direction was erroneous, cautioned against reopening final orders of the Supreme Court to avoid undermining the finality and authority of judicial decisions. They held that the remedy for such errors lies in the review jurisdiction under Article 137 of the Constitution, and that allowing such collateral challenges would open floodgates for repetitive litigation.


The case has profound implications on the scope of jurisdiction of Special Courts under the 1952 Act, the limits of powers of transfer under the CrPC, and the balance between expeditious trial and constitutional safeguards. It reaffirms that jurisdiction to try offences is conferred solely by law enacted by Parliament or the Constitution and that courts cannot confer jurisdiction on themselves or other courts beyond statutory limits. The ruling reiterates the paramount importance of adherence to principles of natural justice and constitutional rights in criminal prosecutions, especially of public officials.


With this verdict, the Supreme Court quashed all proceedings after the 1984 direction and ordered the trial to proceed afresh under the 1952 Act before a Special Judge, thereby restoring the statutory framework and procedural safeguards.


Statutory provisions:- Constitution of India Articles 14, 21, 32, 129, 131, 134, 136, 137, 139A, 142, 145, 226, 228; Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, 10; Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 Sections 374, 401, 406, 407, 460(e); Evidence Act, 1872 Section 115; Civil Procedure Code, 1908 Section 11; Supreme Court Rules, 1966 Order 40 Rule 1; Letters Patent (Bom) Clause 29.


A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (SC)(Constitutional Bench) : Law Finder Doc Id # 89602

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