Supreme Court Upholds Anti-Defection Law, Strikes Down Para 7 of Tenth Schedule for Lack of State Ratification

Majority affirms constitutional validity of anti-defection provisions except for ouster clause barring judicial review; minority holds entire amendment invalid for procedural lapses and lack of independent adjudicatory authority

In a landmark judgment delivered on February 18, 1992, a five-judge Constitution Bench (L.M. Sharma, M.N. Venkatachaliah, J.S. Verma, K. Jayachandra Reddy, and S.C. Agrawal, JJ.) of the Supreme Court of India addressed the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985, which introduced the Tenth Schedule-popularly known as the Anti-Defection Law.

The Tenth Schedule aims to curb the pernicious practice of political defections that threaten the stability and moral foundation of Indian parliamentary democracy. It prescribes disqualification of members of Parliament and State Legislatures who voluntarily give up membership of their political party or vote contrary to party directions without permission. The law seeks to safeguard democratic principles by penalizing unethical floor-crossing motivated by lure of office or other considerations.

Majority Opinion: Validity Affirmed Except Para 7

The majority (Venkatachaliah, Jayachandra Reddy, and Agrawal, JJ.) held that the Tenth Schedule's provisions, particularly Paragraph 2, are constitutionally valid and do not violate fundamental freedoms such as freedom of speech or conscience of elected representatives under Articles 105 and 194 of the Constitution. They emphasized that the anti-defection law strengthens parliamentary democracy by discouraging unprincipled defections.

However, the majority declared Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule unconstitutional. Paragraph 7 provides for a complete bar on judicial review of disqualification decisions under the Schedule, including ouster of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Article 136 and High Courts under Articles 226 and 227. The Court held that Paragraph 7 effects a change “in terms and in effect” in these Articles, thereby attracting the proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution, which mandates ratification of such amendments by at least half of the State Legislatures before the Bill is presented to the President for assent.

Since the Fiftieth-Second Amendment Bill was not ratified by the requisite number of States, Paragraph 7 was found invalid. Nonetheless, the majority applied the doctrine of severability and held that Paragraph 7 is severable from the rest of the Tenth Schedule. The remaining provisions stand independently, workable and constitutionally effective, and hence valid.

The Court also held that the Speaker or Chairman adjudicating disqualification disputes under Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule acts as a tribunal exercising judicial power. While the Schedule confers “finality” on the Speaker’s decision, judicial review is not ousted but limited to jurisdictional errors such as mala fides, perversity, or breach of natural justice. The Court clarified that judicial intervention is barred at interlocutory stages and prior to the final decision, except in cases of interlocutory disqualifications causing irreversible harm.

On the question of the Speaker’s independence, the majority rejected the contention that vesting adjudicatory power in the Speaker violates the basic feature of democracy. They recognized the Speaker as a constitutional functionary of high stature, expected to act impartially, and deemed the investiture of power as constitutionally permissible.

Minority Opinion: Entire Amendment Invalid

The minority (Sharma and Verma, JJ.) dissented strongly. They held that Paragraph 7’s ouster of judicial review unequivocally changes Articles 136, 226, and 227, thus attracting the proviso to Article 368(2). Since ratification by half the States was absent, the entire Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985-including all provisions of the Tenth Schedule-is invalid and an abortive attempt to amend the Constitution. They rejected severability in constitutional amendments requiring ratification.

The minority further emphasized that democracy as a basic feature demands an independent adjudicatory machinery for electoral disputes. The Speaker, being a member of the House dependent on majority support and retaining party membership, does not satisfy this independence requirement. Hence, even if Paragraph 7 were severed, the rest of the Schedule would be unconstitutional for violating the basic structure doctrine.

Consequently, the minority held that all Speaker decisions under the Tenth Schedule must be declared null and void.

Background and Legislative History

The Anti-Defection Law was enacted against a backdrop of rampant political defections that destabilized governments and undermined public trust. Various Committees and Bills since 1967 had sought to address the issue. The 1985 Amendment incorporated detailed provisions on disqualification, adjudication by Speakers or Chairmen, and barred judicial interference through Paragraph 7.

Key Legal Principles and Reasoning

- The Court acknowledged the principle that constitutional amendments altering fundamental rights or judicial review attract the special ratification procedure under Article 368(2) proviso.

- The “finality” clause in Paragraph 6 does not oust judicial review entirely but restricts it to jurisdictional errors, mala fides, and perversity.

- The legal fiction deeming proceedings under Paragraph 6(1) as “proceedings in Parliament” under Articles 122 and 212 confers immunity from procedural irregularities but not from judicial scrutiny.

- The doctrine of severability applies to constitutional amendments unless the invalid part is inseverable or the amendment is stillborn due to procedural defect. The majority found Paragraph 7 severable and invalid due to lack of ratification, but the rest remains valid.

- The minority rejected severability, emphasizing that absence of mandatory ratification invalidates the entire amendment.

- The Speaker’s role as adjudicator is judicial in nature, but the minority viewed the Speaker’s lack of independence as fatal to the constitutional scheme.

Outcome and Directions

- The Supreme Court allowed the transfer petition and withdrew the writ petition for adjudication of constitutional issues.

- The Court upheld the validity of the Anti-Defection Law except for Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule.

- Paragraph 7 was declared unconstitutional for lack of State ratification.

- The remaining provisions are valid and operative.

- The Speaker’s decisions are subject to limited judicial review.

- The writ petitions relating to factual controversies were remitted to the respective High Courts for disposal in accordance with the constitutional principles laid down.

Significance

This judgment is seminal in affirming the constitutional validity of the Anti-Defection Law as a measure to strengthen Indian democracy and curb political instability caused by defections. It also safeguards judicial review as an essential feature of the Constitution, preventing total ouster of courts’ jurisdiction. The ruling balances the need for party discipline with protection of democratic rights and judicial oversight.

Statutory provisions:- Constitution (Fifty-Second Amendment) Act, 1985; Constitution of India Articles 105, 194, 136, 226, 227, 368(2), Schedule 10 (Tenth Schedule)

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