Supreme Court Upholds Judicial Review as Part of Constitution’s Basic Structure, Directs High Court Oversight on Administrative Tribunals

Constitutional Bench Rules Articles 323A and 323B Cannot Exclude High Courts’ Jurisdiction Under Articles 226/227 and Supreme Court’s Under Article 32; Validates Section 5(6) of Administrative Tribunals Act with Safeguards

In a landmark judgment delivered on March 18, 1997, the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court of India in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India comprehensively examined the constitutional validity of provisions relating to Administrative Tribunals and their jurisdiction vis-a-vis the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The Court reaffirmed the inviolability of the judicial review power vested in the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, declaring that these powers form part of the “basic structure” of the Constitution and cannot be excluded even by constitutional amendments.

The judgment arose from challenges to Articles 323A and 323B, introduced by the 42nd Amendment, which empowered Parliament and State Legislatures to establish tribunals for adjudicating service and other disputes, with clauses excluding the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136. These provisions were enacted to reduce the burden on courts by creating “alternative institutional mechanisms” - tribunals intended as substitutes for High Courts in their service-related and other specialized domains.

The Court revisited the earlier five-judge decision in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, which had upheld the constitutionality of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, on the premise that tribunals could serve as effective substitutes for High Courts. However, after more than a decade of practical experience and evolving jurisprudence, the Supreme Court found the tribunals had not functioned as efficaciously as anticipated. It emphasized that while tribunals can adjudicate constitutional validity of statutory provisions and subordinate rules, the ultimate judicial review power lies exclusively with High Courts and the Supreme Court.

Key findings include:

1. Judicial Review as Basic Structure: The Court held that the power of judicial review vested in High Courts and the Supreme Court, especially the authority to test the constitutionality of statutes, is an integral feature of the Constitution’s basic structure. This power cannot be ousted by Parliament or State Legislatures.

2. Invalidity of Jurisdiction Exclusion: Clauses in Articles 323A(2)(d) and 323B(3)(d) that exclude the jurisdiction of High Courts under Articles 226/227 and the Supreme Court under Article 32, to the extent they bar judicial review, were declared unconstitutional. Consequently, Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and similar exclusion clauses in other tribunal statutes are unconstitutional to the same extent.

3. Tribunals as Supplemental Mechanisms: Administrative and other tribunals are competent to decide constitutional validity issues but only in a supplemental capacity. All their decisions must be subject to scrutiny by a Division Bench of the relevant High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the tribunal functions.

4. Appeal Procedure Modified: Direct appeals from tribunal decisions to the Supreme Court under Article 136 are not permissible. Instead, appeals must first lie to the Division Bench of the High Court, and thereafter to the Supreme Court, preserving judicial hierarchy and oversight.

5. Composition of Tribunals: The Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(6) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, allowing single-member benches to decide cases. However, it mandated that when constitutional questions arise, such cases must be referred to a bench of at least two members, including a judicial member, ensuring adequate judicial expertise.

6. Administrative Supervision of Tribunals: Recognizing administrative inefficiencies and lack of uniform supervision, the Court recommended placing all tribunals under a single nodal ministry, preferably the Ministry of Law, which may appoint an independent supervisory body to oversee functioning and maintain independence.

7. No Direct High Court Access: Litigants are not entitled to bypass tribunals and directly approach High Courts on matters falling within the tribunal’s jurisdiction, except where the constitutional validity of the tribunal’s parent statute itself is challenged.

The Court traced the constitutional history and jurisprudence on judicial review, referencing landmark cases such as Kesavananda Bharati, Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, Minerva Mills, and others. It highlighted the fundamental role of judicial review in maintaining the balance of powers, protecting fundamental rights, and upholding the rule of law.

While acknowledging the tribunals’ importance in reducing High Court caseload, the Court stressed that they cannot replace the constitutional courts in their core role of judicial review. The judgment also criticized the current functioning of tribunals, citing reports and expert committee recommendations that pointed to issues like inadequate expertise, executive influence, and procedural delays.

This ruling mandates a recalibration of tribunal functioning and appellate mechanisms, strengthening the High Courts’ supervisory jurisdiction and reaffirming the Supreme Court’s role as the final constitutional arbiter. It paves the way for reforms to improve tribunal efficiency while safeguarding constitutional principles.

The directions contained in this judgment will apply prospectively to future tribunal decisions, ensuring continuity and stability in ongoing proceedings.

Statutory provisions: Articles 32, 136, 226, 227, 309, 323A, 323B of the Constitution of India; Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Sections 5(6), 6, 14, 17, 21, 28, 29, 35, 36, 37)

L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (SC) (Constitutional Bench) : Law Finder Doc Id # 20495