The court clarifies the interpretation of "forthwith" under Section 102(3) of the Cr.P.C., emphasizing that seizure is not vitiated by delay unless prejudice is shown.
In a significant ruling, the Delhi High Court, presided over by Justice Saurabh Banerjee, has set aside previous orders from the Saket Courts that allowed the de-freezing of a bank account despite a delay in reporting the seizure to the Magistrate. The case, Narinder Kumar Nangia v. State, revolved around the interpretation of "forthwith" as mentioned in Section 102(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The petitioner, Narinder Kumar Nangia, had initially filed an FIR against respondent no. 2, alleging fraudulent sale of an agricultural plot. Subsequently, the respondent's bank account was frozen as proceeds from the sale were deposited there. However, the freezing order faced challenges due to the delay in reporting the seizure to the Magistrate.
Justice Banerjee referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Shento Varghese v. Julfikar Husen, which elaborated that "forthwith" should be interpreted as "as soon as possible," considering the circumstances. The court held that such delays do not invalidate the seizure unless the delay causes prejudice to the accused or remains unexplained.
The court found that the orders of the learned Trial Court and Revisional Court, which had allowed the de-freezing based on the delay, were impermissible as they contradicted the legal position clarified by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the Delhi High Court exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to set aside these orders.
This judgment reaffirms that while delays in reporting seizures should be addressed, they do not inherently nullify the seizure unless it can be demonstrated that the delay caused prejudice or was without reasonable explanation. The court also indicated that unexplained delays could lead to departmental action, but do not invalidate the act of seizure itself.
Bottom Line:
Interpretation of the term "forthwith" under Section 102(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) clarified by the Supreme Court as requiring reasonable construction based on the nature of the act and prevailing circumstances of the case. Delay in reporting seizure to the Magistrate does not vitiate the seizure itself unless prejudice is demonstrated.
Statutory provision(s): Section 102(3), Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Narinder Kumar Nangia v. State, (Delhi) : Law Finder Doc id # 2884643
